Five things at the top of China’s agenda for 2025

2024 has been a challenging year for China. As its government has tackled economic problems at home^[1], internationally it has handled the complexities of an alliance with Russia. And, while China has continued to play a significant role in the global economy, there are five possible areas that could derail its plans in 2025.

1. Renewed rivalry with the US

The most obvious concern for Beijing will be the reignition^[2] of an ultra-aggressive US policy towards China, after Donald Trump steps into office in January. Trump has already threatened^[3] China and several other nations with 60% tariffs, which suggests a continuation of the ongoing trade war that he started during his previous presidency.

A more contentious relationship with the US will pose a significant challenge for China – but Beijing is not unprepared for it, having learned^[4] from the previous US trade war. This can be seen in how Chinese firms such as Huawei have sought to reduce their reliance on US markets and technologies while expanding^[5] into other fields.

Equally, China has been more willing to use punitive measures against the US, as was recently demonstrated by its restriction^[6] on the export of rare earth elements (used for batteries and catalytic converters). As a result, Beijing is better placed to fight a trade war than it was in 2017.

2. Global technology wars

While tariffs will undoubtedly attract the most attention, it’s possible that another battle will be waged over China’s technological development^[7], which poses a notable challenge to US trade supremacy^[8].

Technology has become an increasingly crucial element in China’s plans, with Beijing looking to grow jobs and production in this sector^[9], in part by increasing its exports. Equally, curtailing this has become a priority for the US, underlined by its efforts to restrict^[10] Chinese access to semiconductor technology – one of the new key battlefronts.

As well as a contest to gain dominance over key technologies, it is also a competition over setting the standards for technology^[11]. This is demonstrated by what has been labelled the “Beijing effect”^[12], whereby China aims to set standards for digital infrastructure in the same way that the EU has for data management and privacy through its GDPR legislation^[13]. Such a move could potentially grant China strategic leadership in the tech world.

3. Tariffs from the EU

China has an equally challenging trade conflict^[14] with Europe, in the form of a series of tit-for-tat tariffs^[15] – with Beijing slapping import tariffs on French brandy, for example, in response to EU restrictions on imports of Chinese electric vehicles to EU member states. These come at a time where China has started to make inroads^[16] into technologies that were once the preserve of other nations.

A trade war with the EU, coupled with recent discussions^[17] about expanding Nato’s role in Asia, could pose a headache for Beijing, especially if this leads to greater alignment between Brussels and Washington. There again, Trump’s established antagonism^[18] towards the EU could potentially work in China’s favour, if it means the EU is looking for other partners.

4. Allying with Russia

On the surface, Russia has become increasingly vital for China as a source of natural resources^[19] and markets – while China is a key source of economic support^[20] for Moscow. However, this support has adversely affected China’s relations with European states, some of which have seen Beijing as a facilitator^[21] of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Equally, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war may continue to be a useful distraction^[22] for Beijing, keeping US attention away from China.

Trump’s proposed peace plan^[23] for the Ukraine war, if successful, could allow the US to focus back on China. A resolution of that conflict could even provide an avenue for rapprochement^[24] between Washington and Moscow, which would work against Beijing.

5. Conflicts in the Middle East

An emerging source of concern for China is the severe instability in the Middle East. As with Russia, the region has become a key source^[25] of resources and markets for Beijing – demonstrated by the Zhuhai airshow^[26], where nations from the region were key customers for Chinese arms.

Another concern for Beijing has been the potential for a regional conflict between Iran and Israel, with the former^[27] a key source of oil for China. In the event of an armed conflict, these supplies^[28] could be disrupted if not cut off completely, which would create further economic problems for Beijing.

Equally, the reignition of the Syrian civil war^[29] has highlighted an area of concern for President Xi Jinping. Chinese Uyghurs (a largely Muslim ethnic group) have been involved in forces overthrowing President Bashar al-Assad^[30], particularly as part of the Turkestan Islamic party^[31] (TIP). Some members of the TIP have been threatening to use weapons acquired in Syria in the long-running battle for a separate state in the Xinjiang region of China, where the Uyghurs are based.

In the past few years, Xi’s forces have rounded up around a million Uyghurs^[32] and placed them in detention camps, and enforced a policy of re-education and intensive surveillance which has drawn international criticism for its tactics and authoritarianism.

Read more: Three possible futures for the global economy if Trump brings in new trade tariffs^[33]

While all these factors suggest China faces a difficult 2025, there are also signs that Beijing is preparing to mitigate them. Not least, China will be studying^[34] the sanctions regime deployed by the west against Russia, and which would likely be used against China in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.

Ultimately, how 2025 works out for Beijing will be crucial to whether it decides it needs to make new allies, develop new markets, and create new economic strengths^[35] in the technology field.

References

1. ^{^} home (think.ing.com)
2. ^{^} reignition (www.barrons.com)
3. ^{^} threatened (www.politico.eu)
4. ^{^} learned (www.researchgate.net)
5. ^{^} expanding (fortune.com)
6. ^{^} restriction (foreignpolicy.com)
7. ^{^} technological development (www.bloomberg.com)
8. ^{^} US trade supremacy (ecfr.eu)
9. ^{^} production in this sector (www.bloomberg.com)
10. ^{^} restrict (www.nytimes.com)
11. ^{^} standards for technology (www.economist.com)
12. ^{^} “Beijing effect” (cld.web.ox.ac.uk)
13. ^{^} GDPR legislation (academic.oup.com)
14. ^{^} trade conflict (thediplomat.com)
15. ^{^} tit-for-tat tariffs (www.reuters.com)
16. ^{^} make inroads (hbr.org)
17. ^{^} discussions (www.cfr.org)
18. ^{^} antagonism (www.reuters.com)
19. ^{^} natural resources (www.reuters.com)
20. ^{^} economic support (www.scmp.com)
21. ^{^} facilitator (merics.org)
22. ^{^} distraction (www.npr.org)
23. ^{^} proposed peace plan (foreignpolicy.com)
24. ^{^} rapprochement (asiatimes.com)
25. ^{^} key source (www.cfr.org)
26. ^{^} Zhuhai airshow (www.scmp.com)
27. ^{^} former (www.hudson.org)
28. ^{^} supplies (www.nytimes.com)
29. ^{^} Syrian civil war (www.scmp.com)
30. ^{^} President Bashar al-Assad (www.scmp.com)
31. ^{^} Turkestan Islamic party (www.newsweek.com)
32. ^{^} around a million Uyghurs (www.cfr.org)
33. ^{^} Three possible futures for the global economy if Trump brings in new trade tariffs (theconversation.com)
34. ^{^} studying (www.wsj.com)
35. ^{^} new economic strengths (www.isdp.eu)