Why Nato is struggling to rebuild itself in an increasingly threatening world

In the years after Nato was formed in 1949, its US and European members had a collective approach to defence with clear goals in common, largely built around the protection of western Europe against the Soviet Union. Throughout this era, the US and Europe both relied^[1] on the stability of the international system by creating international cooperation on shared dilemmas.

Fast forward more than 70 years, and there is now a ticking clock^[2] on reinventing the transatlantic alliance.

European security and US-led Nato security are no longer one and the same. Certainly, recent statements^[3] from US leaders that the US will prioritise empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security has made for tough listening in Europe.

For some, this may be an overdue opportunity to fundamentally rework the transatlantic security relationship. For others, such statements are worryingly set against the backdrop of Trump’s pro-Russia stance, with Trump’s demands sounding sinister at best.

Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte recently outlined a need^[4] to “build a stronger, a fairer and more lethal NATO”. Global threats were creating a more dangerous world, he argued.

From its establishment by 12 states on April 4, 1949, until the end of the cold war era, Nato was focused on one big thing: deterring Soviet aggression. Ultimately, Nato had one job, one enemy, one threat, one theatre and one instrument of power.

It was a partnership^[5] that enabled the US to build and maintain a more permanent role in European security. This collective security plan prevented the US from falling back into isolationist^[6] foreign policies that it had held before the second world war

Arguably, US attitudes fluctuated throughout this era. Initially the country sought a temporary role in Nato^[7], with limited military commitment. It also encouraged western European Nato members to take early and primary responsibility for defence.

However, the huge Soviet nuclear threat hardened US attitudes. And Nato came to be seen as key to the US’s overall ability to prevent a Soviet invasion of western Europe. Equally important was the role of the Marshall Plan^[8], a massive post-war reconstruction plan for Europe, which (in conjunction with Nato) represented the US’s desire to work with European partners to both stabilise the region^[9], and ensure democracy.

Through the decades that followed, the US saw Nato as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. It is important to remember that transactionality^[10] has always been an integral part of the transatlantic relationship, but it was never at the expense of the values that underpinned it, and indeed reinforced both US national and European regional interests in doing so.

Throughout the 1990s, and well into the 2000s, Nato clearly represented the US’s preferred method of maintaining its military presence in Europe (including US bases, weapons and troops stationed in member countries). The US drove the redefinition of post-cold war Nato, to include former Warsaw Pact countries including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Read more: US and Russia squabble over Arctic security as melting ice opens up shipping routes^[11]

The question now is whether US leadership in Nato was focused so extensively on security of Europe and pushing back against the Soviets that for a long time the dilemma of who paid for what was essentially set aside.

But two wake-up calls were to come. The first was the increasingly clear indications from US administrations from Barack Obama’s presidency onwards^[12] that the US was ill at ease with Nato as a whole, and it was unhappy with the lower financial commitment, than the US, coming from European members.

The second was in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea. Unfortunately, the first warning sign by Obama was largely ignored; and when Russia invaded Crimea, Nato did not step up^[13] to push back against Putin’s expansionism.

Now, Nato finds itself once again in the crosshairs of US anger about funding, and with Trump furious at European defence spending levels, and determined to massively revise the transatlantic bargain.

Trump’s first administration put spending from European Nato members^[14] firmly on the table. His recent position is merely a continuation^[15] of that theme.

From the European perspective, the US was, and is, a key part of the collective security structure that has empowered European defence and deterrence, but possibly with an out-of-date funding model.

Trump, meanwhile, appears to see the US’s involvement^[16] as politically naïve. He seems to view Nato as strategically futile and defence spending imbalances^[17] as an indication that Nato is nothing more than a giant security racket.

What is stark is the reversal between the US having helped found Nato^[18] and as the leading nation backing of a rule-bound global system under international law and Trump’s preference^[19] to reject any responsibilities for global leadership and stability.

What has come as a shock to European members is not perhaps the demands regarding improving defence funding, but the abdication of US leadership and the threat to leave Nato completely, with no ongoing US responsibility to defend the world order^[20].

The onus is now on European Nato members to make both serious and swift changes. Indications of far more serious financial commitments, including from Germany^[21], are emerging. European defence spending^[22] overall increased by 11.7% over the last year to roughly €423.3 billion (£371 billion), representing ten years of consecutive regional growth.

Next steps include focusing on^[23] AI-led technologies, cheap drones, digital tech and improved commitments to joint projects.

But the hardest task is also the most urgent. Namely^[24], to avoid the chaos of a unilateral US withdrawal from Nato.

There’s a need to move the financial and military burden to Europe in a way agreeable to the US before the Nato summit in June. Discussions on how to achieve this need to cover everything from nuclear deterrence to challenges arising from the conflict in Ukraine.

Whether Rutte and European states can indeed preserve and maintain the collective security foundations on which Nato was first built remains to be seen. But, certainly, the current world situation is no less dangerous that the world in which Nato itself was first built.

References

1. ^{^} both relied (carnegieendowment.org)
2. ^{^} ticking clock (carnegieendowment.org)
3. ^{^} recent statements (carnegieendowment.org)
4. ^{^} outlined a need (www.nato.int)
5. ^{^} It was a partnership (www.taylorfrancis.com)
6. ^{^} into isolationist (history.state.gov)
7. ^{^} temporary role in Nato (www.nato.int)
8. ^{^} Marshall Plan (history.state.gov)
9. ^{^} stabilise the region (www.iwm.org.uk)
10. ^{^} transactionality (carnegieendowment.org)
11. ^{^} US and Russia squabble over Arctic security as melting ice opens up shipping routes (theconversation.com)
12. ^{^} Barack Obama’s presidency onwards (www.atlanticcouncil.org)
13. ^{^} Nato did not step up (foreignpolicy.com)
14. ^{^} European Nato members (www.bbc.co.uk)
15. ^{^} a continuation (www.theguardian.com)
16. ^{^} US’s involvement (www.nbcnews.com)
17. ^{^} defence spending imbalances (www.theguardian.com)
18. ^{^} helped found Nato (carnegieendowment.org)
19. ^{^} Trump’s preference (carnegieendowment.org)
20. ^{^} defend the world order (carnegieendowment.org)
21. ^{^} Germany (www.reuters.com)
22. ^{^} European defence spending (www.euronews.com)
23. ^{^} focusing on (theconversation.com)
24. ^{^} Namely (www.ft.com)