Europe may struggle to replace the military intelligence that Ukraine needs – but it has key strengths

US intelligence has been an essential part of Ukraine’s defence for over a decade. Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014 the US has been supplying Kyiv with a continuous stream of electronic, satellite and human intelligence. This has been decisive^[1] in the war with Russia in providing warnings and in making Ukrainian attacks on the Russian military more effective.

If President Donald Trump were to return to pausing^[2], or withdrawing US military intelligence from Kyiv, its depth and breadth will be very difficult to replace. Europe remains the most obvious source of replacement intelligence capabilities, but as yet cannot replace the US’s scale, speed and quality of military intelligence.

A US withdrawal of intelligence will leave Ukraine with less real-time intelligence about Russian military formations and movements. It will also reduce Kyiv’s targeting accuracy on the battlefield^[3]. Ukraine is likely to be exposed to more aerial attacks and heavier military and civilian casualties^[4], because of receiving fewer warnings.

If Europe tries to replace the US’s intelligence contribution in Ukraine it will require a stark increase in funding from the UK and EU member states. More importantly, it will require a strong focus on coordination, and overcoming some European legal restrictions^[5] on sharing intelligence. These are aspects that will require more trust and political will than the EU (and UK) have been able to show before.

What could happen next?

Since Trump arrived in the White House, European nations have promised to offer more support to Ukraine militarily and are likely to increase their intelligence support for Ukraine. This will be an important signal to the US that Europe is not entirely reliant upon them.

However, Europe’s best intelligence efforts will still leave Ukraine disadvantaged in comparison to where it was under former president Joe Biden^[6]. This is due to the sheer scale of the US intelligence community. Its strengths include: information from informants^[7], from communications^[8], from imagery^[9] and from assessment about enemy capabilities^[10].

The UK, France and Germany do have strength in battlefield communication and electronic intelligence. The UK operates the US-built RC-135^[11] Rivet Joint intelligence aircraft to intercept Russian military communications and radar outputs from international airspace. France runs its satellite-based CERES^[12] interception programme, while Germany also routinely intercepts Russian communications. Other less capable European nations, on Russia’s borders, also maintain their own interception programmes.

Read more: What is the value of US security guarantees? Here's what history shows^[13]

European signals intelligence (information gathered from people communicating with each other) could partially replace the US on the Ukrainian battlefield, especially in the areas around the EU/Nato borders. But it will not deliver the same level of information from further afield. They can provide Ukraine with communications intercepts and electronic surveillance, but without the reach^[14] and speed of the US. The US is able to process intelligence fast as it has far more analysts.

Britain, France and Germany have considerable human networks (such as informants) in Russia, Ukraine and in other countries such as China^[15] and Iran, but not as many as the US outside those areas.

Problems caused by US withdrawal

Much of the west’s ability, when it comes to offering more support to Ukraine, is stymied by how closely its systems have been tied to, and are dependent upon, the US. For instance, the UK’s military intelligence community has relied on double checking with colleagues in the US, when gathering potentially useful information.

Satellite imagery and reconnaissance is an intelligence function that European nations can supply to Ukraine, but not on the scale of the US. France is a global leader in optical imaging via its Helios and CSO^[16] satellites, with additional access to high resolution commercial satellites.

But there are some clear areas where other western nations will be able to help. Europe has been able to provide Ukraine with access to commercial satellites quickly after US aerospace company Maxar^[17] suspended Ukrainian use.

Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR)^[18] already shares a dedicated platform to analyse French satellite imagery ^[19]. Germany and Italy have very capable satellite-based radar^[20] imaging systems and provide data from these to Ukraine.

While Europe lacks satellite-based infrared^[21] early-warning systems for missile launch detection (which only the US and Russia has) it does have powerful imaging resources to track ground developments.

But in intelligence analysis, one of the areas of advantage for the US is in part due to scale, but also due to computing advantages in the US to deploy big data^[22] and AI on intelligence questions. European partners rely^[23] heavily on the US for this capability which means that Ukraine will receive less real-time intelligence information and possibly lower quality intelligence assessments too.

Concerns about sharing information?

If the US fully withdraws from supplying Ukraine with intelligence, the Europeans will face coordination^[24] issues to gather together intelligence without the US as co-ordinator.

The longstanding integration of western intelligence (especially between US and UK through Nato) means Europe will have to overcome 70 years of institutional memory to create new working patterns if the US withdraws fully from sharing security information, or is no longer seen as a reliable partner. European and Canadian nervousness^[25] around sharing intelligence (and Australia and New Zealand, to a lesser extent) with Trump’s government will further complicate the western intelligence picture. However the situation will be to the advantage of Russia and China^[26], who know that Ukraine is weakened by a lack of access to US information and support.

To improve their intelligence efforts, European, and other western nations which support Ukraine, will also need to increase their global collection of information. This is because, for example, weapons used by Russia in Ukraine have their origins in and transit from China, North Korea^[27], and Iran.

Overall, the western allies, without the US, have a strong package of military intelligence but there are plenty of areas they are going to need to improve on, if the US is not going to play the leadership role it once had.

References

1. ^{^} decisive (www.nytimes.com)
2. ^{^} pausing (www.reuters.com)
3. ^{^} on the battlefield (www.politico.com)
4. ^{^} civilian casualties (www.spectator.co.uk)
5. ^{^} restrictions (www.politico.eu)
6. ^{^} Joe Biden (www.cnn.com)
7. ^{^} information from informants (www.dni.gov)
8. ^{^} communications (www.nsa.gov)
9. ^{^} imagery (usnwc.libguides.com)
10. ^{^} enemy capabilities (www.threatngsecurity.com)
11. ^{^} RC-135 (www.raf.mod.uk)
12. ^{^} CERES (cnes.fr)
13. ^{^} What is the value of US security guarantees? Here's what history shows (theconversation.com)
14. ^{^} reach (www.theguardian.com)
15. ^{^} China (www.theguardian.com)
16. ^{^} CSO (www.airbus.com)
17. ^{^} Maxar (www.reuters.com)
18. ^{^} (HUR) (gur.gov.ua)
19. ^{^} French satellite imagery (www.intelligenceonline.com)
20. ^{^} radar (www.eoportal.org)
21. ^{^} infrared (www.lockheedmartin.com)
22. ^{^} big data (academic.oup.com)
23. ^{^} rely (www.politico.eu)
24. ^{^} coordination (www.politico.eu)
25. ^{^} nervousness (www.bbc.com)
26. ^{^} Russia and China (thediplomat.com)
27. ^{^} North Korea (www.theguardian.com)